1 .
I n t roduct ion
The Folk Theorem for repeated games asserts that any feasible, individually rational payoffs for a one-shot game can arise as Nash equilibrium average payoffs when the game is infinitely repeated.
In our [1986] paper, which extends this result to subgame perfect equilibrium and discounting, we assumed that the players can condition their play on the realization of a publicly observed random variable.
We asserted, however, that abandoning the assumption would lead to only a slight weakening of the results;
viz., any feasible, individually rational payoffs can be approximated by a perfect equilibrium where there is sufficiently little discounting. This note shows that, in fact, our extension of the Folk Theorem holds in a strong sense even without public randomization: all feasible individually rational payoffs can be exactly attained in equilibrium.
Although this stronger result is of some interest by itself, its true significance appears in connection with mixed strategies.
Early analyses of repeated games with little or no discounting (Aumann-Shapley [1976] , Friedman [1971] and Rubinstein [1979] The Folk Theorem without Public Randomization
Our [1986] (1-6)}. and set a(t)=a
This defines an algorithm for computing a(t)
2. If there is a tie, make a deterministic selection.
The algorithm is well-defined, i.e., the set C(t) is never empty. Roughly speaking, the algorithm of Lemma 1 works as follows. Because the x (j)'s are rational, we can find integers 
